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COLLOQUIUM
THE LEGAL PROFESSION’S
MONOPOLY ON THE PRACTICE OF LAW
FOREWORD:
THE PROFESSION’S MONOPOLY
AND ITS CORE VALUES
W. Bradley Wendel*
I.
The position of the organized bar regarding regulation—the bar’s nomos,
as Susan Koniak terms it1—is stated right up front, in the preamble to the
American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
The legal profession aspires to be largely self-regulating, but in the
American system, it depends on state courts to adopt and enforce the
disciplinary rules it constructs.2 Self-regulation ensures the independence
of the legal profession from dominance by the legislative and executive
branches of government.3 There is a quid pro quo, however; for the bar to
retain its privilege of self-regulation, it must adopt regulations that are “in
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I am grateful to Bruce Green for inviting me to
write the Foreword to the proceedings of this Colloquium.
1. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389,
1389 (1992).
2. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 10 (2013). The Restatement (Third)
of the Law Governing Lawyers is clearer on the relationship between the organized bar and
regulation by the judiciary: the American Bar Association proposes model rules, which are
approved, promulgated, and enforced by state courts—generally the highest court in a state.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmt. b (2000). As a
matter of constitutional law, the power to adopt rules for the regulation of the legal
profession is inherent in the function of the judiciary. Id. § 1 cmt. c. The profession in other
common law countries, notably Canada and New Zealand, is self-regulating to a much
greater extent than in the United States. See, e.g., DUNCAN WEBB, ETHICS: PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAWYER 77 (2000); John M. Law, The Legal Profession and
Lawyer Regulation in Canada, in ALICE WOOLLEY ET AL., LAWYERS’ ETHICS AND
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 49 (2008); Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93
MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009). The United Kingdom and Australia, by contrast, have recently
undergone comprehensive regulatory reforms driven by their respective parliaments. See,
e.g., ANDREW BOON & JENNIFER LEVIN, THE ETHICS AND CONDUCT OF LAWYERS IN ENGLAND
AND WALES 109–29 (2008).
3. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 11; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmt. d (“Self-regulation provides protection
of lawyers against political control by the state.”).
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the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested
concerns of the bar.”4 As Deborah Rhode, long a critic of the profession’s
asserted monopoly on regulatory authority, has quipped, what distinguishes
the American bar from a retail grocers’ association is the ability of the
former to present self-regulation as a social value.5 The bar does not lack
arguments in justification of its monopoly, including the traditional appeal
to the relationship between regulatory independence and the rule of law.
From this perspective, according to a partner at a prominent law firm,
the ethical rules for protecting the professional independence of the bar
need to take into account the role of the legal profession as an
independent bulwark between individuals or organizations and the
political branches of government.6

Independence is a social value, in this view, because it permits the client to
be completely candid with the lawyer who, in turn, will be in a position to
counsel the client on compliance with the law.7 On this conception of
independence, the legal profession should not be subject to regulation by
government agencies, such as the SEC, which “are not in any meaningful
way adjudicative entities whose responsibility it is to be impartial and to
eschew political direction.”8 Protecting the rights of citizens, an essential
aspect of the rule of law, therefore requires an independent legal profession.
Difficulties with the traditional defense of the professional monopoly
have long been apparent, even before the recent challenges posed by the
globalization of the market for legal services and the potentially disruptive
effects of information technology. One problem is that the bar seems to
worry about only one type of interference with the professional judgment of
lawyers. The bar tends to worry very much that the advice given to clients
by their lawyers will be skewed by the lawyers’ quite understandable
interest in avoiding legal sanctions imposed on them by government
regulators.9 But this concern relates to only one side of the tacit bargain
between society and the legal profession. Lawyers enjoy the privilege of
self-regulation so that they can practice in the public interest the craft of
representing clients within the bounds of the law. In order to act in the
public interest, lawyers must also remain independent, to a significant

4. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 12.
5. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 143 (2000).
6. Evan A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1281, 1281 (2003).
7. In a frequently cited passage, the U.S. Supreme Court described the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege similarly, as “to encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of
law and administration of justice.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
8. Davis, supra note 6, at 1289.
9. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, The Fallout from Enron: Media Frenzy and Misguided
Notions of Public Relations Are No Reason To Abandon Our Commitment to Our Clients,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1243, 1250–52 (worrying that overzealous SEC regulation of business
lawyers will deprive clients of information to which they are entitled).
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degree, from the interests of their own clients.10 The civic republican ideal
often associated with the private practice career and writings of Justice
Louis D. Brandeis emphasizes the legal profession’s mediating role,
seeking to balance the interests of various factions to arrive at a socially
desirable outcome.11 Thus, lawyers for a powerful corporation may be
called upon to “use their influence to discourage their clients from unjust or
antisocial projects.”12 This is a far cry from the preoccupation with the
interests of clients that one often finds in defense of the profession’s
monopoly on regulation. It is clear from the bar’s response to the SEC’s
repeated attempts to regulate securities lawyers that these lawyers are not
thinking of themselves as wise “lawyer statesmen” who are uniquely
positioned to deliberate about what would be best from a public-spirited
point of view.13 Instead, after each of several repeated episodes of lawyer
complicity in massive financial frauds by their clients, lawyers worried not
that they were not doing enough to protect the public interest, but that
proposed government regulations would turn them into whistleblowers or
deputy law enforcement officers.14 Lawyers have not been observed
clamoring for regulatory standards that increase their distance from clients.
The bar’s own actions belie its assertions concerning the connection
between its regulatory monopoly and the public interest.
Another problem with the traditional defense of the regulatory monopoly
is that the bar appears to pay only lip service to the problem of access to
justice for poor and middle-income people.15 Outside the context of the
right to counsel in felony criminal prosecutions,16 the law governing
lawyers recognizes exclusively negative rights to counsel. That is, there is
no positive right to have a lawyer provided and paid for by public funds,
and others are prohibited from interfering with the lawyer-client
relationship in certain ways.17 The organized bar readily rallies to defend

10. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 13–
14 (1988).
11. Id. at 14 (quoting LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law (May 4, 1905), in
BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 329, 337 (1933)).
12. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 128
(1998).
13. Cf. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 127, 141–43 (1993) (arguing for a conception of legal ethics in which lawyers
internalize an attitude of civic-mindedness and endeavor to set aside concerns for the private
interests of their clients).
14. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, Lawyer Exceptionalism in the Gatekeeping Wars, 63 SMU
L. REV. 73, 108 (2010); Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle
with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1270, 1273 (2003).
15. See, e.g., Rebecca Aviel, Why Civil Gideon Won’t Fix Family Law, 122 YALE L.J.
2106 (2013); Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 531 (1994); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1785 (2001).
16. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding that the right to counsel
applies to all defendants in felony crime cases).
17. A clear example is the anticontact rule, under which attorneys are prohibited from
contacting opposing parties who are represented by counsel in the matter. See MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2013).
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these negative rights, such as the attorney-client privilege, from any
conceivable threat.18 In contrast, it is passive, for the most part, in the face
of massive deprivations of the positive right to counsel. To take an obvious
example, parents facing a state proceeding seeking to terminate their
parental rights do not have a right to publicly funded legal representation,
even though the interest in preserving the relationship with one’s children is
of overwhelming importance—probably more important for most parents
than avoiding a thirty-day jail sentence for shoplifting.19 Similarly, publicbenefits claimants may require an attorney to face bureaucratic obstacles or
opposition to obtain the benefits to which they are entitled, but the
legislative efforts to provide an effective positive right to counsel in publicbenefits cases have mostly been laughable.20 In any event, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional prohibition on
requiring civil rights claimants to waive the right to recover attorney’s fees
as a condition of settlement.21 The bar has also remained fairly quiet as
business groups seek to intimidate and even defund law school legal clinics
providing assistance to people suing for harms such as environmental
damage.22 Although some bar leaders, such as the Chief Judge of the New
York Court of Appeals, have taken concrete steps to mitigate the problem
of access to justice,23 by and large the legal profession seems unconcerned
that its vigorous efforts to enforce its monopoly over the provision of legal
services is exacerbating existing social disparities.
The legal profession has always been rhetorically committed to the
distinction between a business and a profession24 but has nevertheless
accommodated itself to the influences of nonlawyers in some contexts.25
Insurance defense representation is the clearest example. Liability insurers
have the contractual right to control the defense of the insured’s case,
18. See, e.g., Koniak, supra note 1, at 1398–1401 (recounting an example of the bar’s
resistance to attempts by prosecutors to issue subpoenas to defense lawyers).
19. See Aviel, supra note 15, at 2111.
20. See, e.g., Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 334–35
(1985) (upholding a $10 cap on fees paid to attorneys to obtain death or disability benefits
from the Veterans Administration).
21. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 719–20 (1986).
22. Accord David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive
Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 225, 236–40 (2003).
23. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 520.16 (2013); see also Benjamin P.
Cooper, Mandatory Pro Bono Redux: Guest Correspondent’s Report from the United States,
15 LEGAL ETHICS 135, 135, 138–39 (2012) (describing Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman’s
initiative to require all law students to perform fifty hours of pro bono service as a condition
of admission to practice in New York and describing the bar’s “level of resistance to this
relatively minor change”).
24. See Ted Schneyer, “Professionalism” As Pathology: The ABA’s Latest Policy
Debate on Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Practice Entities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 75, 94–
102 (2012). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor famously relied on this distinction in her dissent
in a lawyer advertising case. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 488–89 (1988)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
25. See John S. Dzienkowski, The Future of Big Law: Alternative Legal Service
Providers to Corporate Clients, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2995, 3001 (2014) (noting that, despite
the bar’s resistance to multidisciplinary practices, large law firms have increasingly come to
rely on nonlawyers to provide certain types of legal services).
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including the hiring, supervision, and termination of counsel; access to
confidential client information; and the settlement of the case. Although
the insured is, at least, the lawyer’s primary client (and, in some states, the
sole client), defense lawyers have duties to insurers that may result in
liability for malpractice in the event of breach.26 As a result, the traditional
model of the attorney-client relationship, with a single client to whom the
attorney owes undivided duties of loyalty, breaks down in the insurancedefense context.27 The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
includes a curious provision recognizing certain informal methods that have
evolved for insurance defense lawyers to deal with conflicts of interest in
ways that would be impermissible in other contexts:
Certain practices of designated insurance-defense counsel have become
customary and, in any event, involve primarily standardized protection
afforded by a regulated entity in recurring situations. Thus a particular
practice permissible . . . under this Section [may not be permissible] for a
lawyer in noninsurance arrangements with significantly different
characteristics.28

The insurance defense problem is the dog that did not bark for the
profession’s concern about its monopoly, independence, interference by
nonlawyers, and core values.
Here we have nonlawyers—liability
insurers—with their own clear commercial interests, which are opposed in
many cases to those of both lawyers and their clients, and yet are permitted
to exercise significant control over the conduct of litigation. Moreover, the
lawyers who are paid by liability insurers are permitted to fudge the rules
on conflicts of interest. Granting that the liability insurance contract is
extensively regulated by state law,29 it is still difficult to reconcile the bar’s
acquiescence in the interference by nonlawyers in the attorney-client
relationship in this context with its vehement opposition to the ABA
Commission on Ethics 20/20’s modest proposals for nonlawyer investments
in law firms.30
26. See, e.g., Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 601–02 (Ariz.
2001); Nevada Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Clark, 152 P.3d 737,
739 (Nev. 2007). For an example of a “single client” case that nevertheless allows a lawsuit
by the insurer against defense counsel under an equitable subrogation theory, see Atlanta
Int’l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W.2d 294, 298–99 (Mich. 1991).
27. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Liability Insurance Contracts and Defense Lawyers: From
Triangles to Tetrahedrons, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 101 (1997); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular
Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1987); Nancy
J. Moore, The Ethical Duties of Insurance Defense Lawyers: Are Special Solutions
Required?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 259 (1997); Thomas D. Morgan, What Insurance Scholars
Should Know About Professional Responsibility, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1997); Ellen Smith
Pryor & Charles Silver, Defense Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities: Part I—Excess
Exposure Cases, 78 TEX. L. REV. 599 (2000); Ellen S. Pryor & Charles Silver, Defense
Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities: Part II—Contested Coverage Cases, 15 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 29 (2001); Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the Eternal Triangle of Insurance
Defense Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475 (1996); Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The
Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255 (1995).
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 134 cmt. f (2000).
29. Cf. Kent D. Syverud, The Duty To Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1120–21 (1990).
30. See Schneyer, supra note 24.
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As a fallback argument in support of the professional monopoly, the
organized bar often appeals to consumer protection as a policy objective. In
contrast with the bar’s response to group legal services plans, the argument
in these cases is not that nonlawyers will interfere with the professional
judgment of lawyers providing legal services. Rather, the fear is that
nonlawyers might outcompete lawyers on pricing and induce consumers to
entrust the protection of their rights to providers who lack the training and
expertise to deal with complicated, sometimes esoteric legal issues. Many
states have unauthorized practice of law (UPL) committees that
aggressively pursue nonlawyers who attempt to provide legal services, who,
in many cases, are addressing the legal needs of low- and middle-income
clients.31 The apotheosis of UPL prosecutions was the effort by the Texas
UPL committee to block the sale of Quicken Family Lawyer, a software
product similar to TurboTax, which allows consumers to input information
and prepare relatively simple legal documents such as wills, advance
healthcare directives, and residential leases.32 Although the legislature
quickly overturned the court’s decision, the district court’s grant of an
injunction stood briefly as almost a self-parody of the bar’s efforts to
restrain competition.33 Now the bar faces competition not just from
software products, but from online providers such as LegalZoom and
Rocket Lawyer.34 LegalZoom abruptly pulled the plug on an announced
initial public offering in August 2012,35 but its net profit of $12.1 million in
31. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1978) (granting an
injunction in a UPL action against a former legal secretary who interviewed clients in
matrimonial matters and typed their information into legal forms); Prof’l Adjusters, Inc. v.
Tandon, 433 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ind. 1982) (invalidating a statute, on negative inherent power
grounds, creating a paraprofession of “certified public adjusters” to assist insureds in making
first-party insurance claims). See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional
Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibition,
34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981) (contending that, rather than protecting the public interest, the
bar’s campaign against the unauthorized practice of law has limited access to legal services
by poor and middle-income clients).
32. See Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. Civ. A.
2859H, 1999 WL 47235, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999), vacated and remanded per
curiam, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999).
33. In the discussion of the Quicken Family Lawyer litigation in his casebook, Stephen
Gillers begins by assuring students that “[t]he following tale is not a spoof from The Onion.”
STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 647 (9th ed.
2012).
34. See, e.g., Lowry v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., No. 2259, 2012 WL 2953109 (N.D. Ohio
July 19, 2012) (dismissing a class action suit for lack of jurisdiction because the Ohio
Supreme Court had not held that the activities of LegalZoom violated a state UPL statute);
Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (denying, in part,
LegalZoom’s motion for summary judgment in a class action filed by consumers asserting
that LegalZoom violated a Missouri UPL statute); Pa. Bar Ass’n Unauthorized Practice of
Law Comm., Formal Op. 2010-01 (2010) (holding that LegalZoom and similar services
violated Pennsylvania’s UPL statute unless the services were provided by lawyers who were
admitted to practice in Pennsylvania). The Missouri class action subsequently settled. See
Samson Habte, Class Action Against LegalZoom Isn’t Valid Unless State High Court Finds
UPL Violation, 28 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 468 (2012).
35. See LegalZoom Delays IPO, L.A. BIZ (Aug. 3, 2012, 12:32 PM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/losangeles/news/2012/08/03/legalzoom-delays-ipo.html.
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the preceding year36 is fairly strong evidence that consumer demand exists
for lower-cost alternatives to traditional models of providing legal services.
American lawyers might be casting nervous glances across the Atlantic,
noting that concerns about consumer protection and access to justice
motivated comprehensive legislative regulatory reform of the legal
profession in England and Wales.37
The cases of LegalZoom and Quicken Family Lawyer also reveal that
one motivation for the reassertion of the values of professionalism and
independence is the disruptive effects of technology. While the legal
profession may not yet be facing the kind of existential threat that has
revolutionized the recorded music industry, information technology has
affected many traditional methods by which lawyers provided services to
clients. The most obvious, at least to practicing lawyers, is 24/7
connectivity with clients and other lawyers, with the accompanying
expectations of immediate responses to requests for information. The ABA
Commission on Ethics 20/20 amended a comment to the competence rule to
specify that lawyers should “keep abreast of changes in the law and its
practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant
technology.”38 The Commission did not, however, provide some useful
guidance to lawyers struggling to understand what competent representation
requires when they are answering questions from clients on their
smartphones, without the benefit of research, or even much time for
reflection.39 The Commission on Ethics 20/20 did acknowledge the risk
that electronic communication and data storage technology could pose to
the confidentiality of client information,40 but again declined to provide
specific guidance—perhaps wisely in this instance, given the frequency
with which technological change occurs and the variety of threats to data
security. For example, a report by the New York City Bar highlighted a
case in which a two-person law firm defending a Marine accused of
involvement in a massacre of civilians in Haditha, Iraq, was hacked by an
online activist group.41 The firm had stored documents online with a
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., John Flood, Will There Be Fallout from Clementi? The Repercussions for
the Legal Profession After the Legal Services Act 2007, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 537, 537–47
(discussing the so-called Clementi report, DAVID CLEMENTI, REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL SERVICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES: FINAL REPORT (2004)).
38. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2013).
39. In fairness to the Commission on Ethics 20/20, what is required by reasonable care is
a question for state tort law, but to the extent the disciplinary rule on competence overlaps
with the law of malpractice, the ABA’s guidance would have been useful.
40. AM. BAR ASS’N, COMM. ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
(2012),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_meeting_105a_filed_may_2012.authcheckdam.pdf.
41. See N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, COMM. ON SMALL LAW FIRMS, THE CLOUD AND THE SMALL
LAW FIRM: BUSINESS, ETHICS AND PRIVILEGE CONSIDERATIONS 10 n.10 (2013), available at
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072378-TheCloudandtheSmallLawFirm.pdf;
see also Martha Neil, Unaware ‘Anonymous’ Existed Until Friday, Partner of Hacked Law
Firm Is Now Fielding FBI Phone Calls, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 6, 2013, 3:02 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/unaware_that_anonymous_hacking_group_existed_
until_friday_law_firm_partner/.
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Google service, and the attack resulted in the disclosure of three gigabytes
of private data, including emails between the firm and its clients.42 Model
Rule 1.6 on confidentiality was recently amended to clarify that, in addition
to tort and agency law duties to ensure the confidentiality of client
information, lawyers have obligations also under the disciplinary rules.43
How many lawyers can confidently say they use the best available
techniques for securing their client data? As these sorts of cases continue to
occur, the profession will undoubtedly adapt to new technologies, whether
it wants to or not.
For every tradition-minded lawyer worried about the erosion of the legal
profession’s monopoly due to the encroaching effects of technology,
services provided by nonlawyer businesspeople, and the values of the
marketplace, there are innovative, entrepreneurial lawyers seeking new
ways to deliver services to clients in an efficient manner that is consistent
with the profession’s core values. A certain reifying tendency is common
in critical discussions of the profession’s monopoly, including the tendency
to assume that there is more that unites lawyers than divides them. As John
Heinz and Edward Laumann demonstrated and subsequently (with new
coauthors) reconfirmed, the practicing bar is strikingly differentiated by
client identity, area of specialization, practice setting, and socioeconomic
status.44 For example, a plaintiff’s personal-injury lawyer handling routine
auto accident and premises liability cases may physically practice law a few
blocks from an in-house lawyer for Goldman Sachs, but there is almost
certainly a huge gulf between these lawyers in terms of ethno-religious
background, undergraduate and legal education, political affiliation, and of
course, income. The bar has likely become more differentiated in recent
years. Maybe scholars would be better off if we no longer talked about the
profession, but analyzed regulatory and ethical issues as they apply to
differentiated professions. On the other hand, it may be that something of
importance will be lost if we abandon the unified profession as an analytical
category. That “something” is what makes the legal profession different in
a normatively significant way—its core values. Too often the notion of
core values is invoked in a question-begging way, or strategically, as a way

42. Id.
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c). A comment to the rule gives a more
detailed analysis of the duties of lawyers regarding electronically stored client information:
Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s efforts
[to safeguard confidential information] include the sensitivity of the information,
the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of
employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the safeguards,
and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to
represent clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of software
excessively difficult to use).
Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 18.
44. See generally JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 6–16 (rev. ed. 1994); JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN
LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2005).
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of fending off competition.45 But as the saying goes, just because you’re
paranoid, it doesn’t mean they aren’t after you. The profession may have
core values that are worth preserving, even if the appeal to core values is
sometimes a rhetorical makeweight. The most fundamental question that
emerges in the context of the rapidly evolving market for legal services is,
what makes lawyers worthy of special concern, i.e., what justifies their
monopoly? This is not an empirical question but a normative one; it is
about the values that make the legal profession distinctive.
A consideration is not a value, let alone a core value, unless it provides
reasons for others to take a positive practical stance toward it—in other
words, to approve of, support, and care about something.46 This may mean
participating in practices that have the effect of sustaining the thing that is
valued.47 Stated less abstractly, if something is said to be a core value of
the legal profession, someone other than lawyers must care about it and
wish for it to be preserved. It may turn out that a purported core value of
the profession, such as a nearly absolute duty of confidentiality, is actually
less important to clients than lawyers believe.48 But there may be
something about the role performed by the legal profession in society that is
normatively significant from the point of view of society as a whole, not
only from the self-interested perspective of lawyers. Two decades ago, the
MacCrate report attempted to define the core values around which the legal
profession is organized.49 Despite the apparent fragmentation of the legal
profession into numerous subgroups and specialized practice areas, the
report argued that ethical lawyering in any context could be understood as
responding to four fundamental values: (1) competence; (2) promoting
justice, fairness, and morality; (3) improving the profession and its selfgovernance; and (4) one’s own professional development.50 Values (3) and
(4) are parasitic on the first two; that is, one cannot say what counts as
individual or collective improvement without a standard of excellence by
which improvement may be measured. Thus, the profession’s core values
according to the MacCrate report are competent representation of clients
and the promotion of the social values of justice, fairness, and morality.
More recently the Carnegie report concluded, “Law schools fail to
complement the focus on skill in legal analyses with effective support for
developing ethical and social skills.”51 Once again, moral and social values

45. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, In Search of Core Values, 16 LEGAL ETHICS 350
(2014).
46. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993)
(defending the expressive theory of value).
47. JOSEPH RAZ, THE PRACTICE OF VALUE (R. Jay Wallace ed., 2003).
48. See generally Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1998) (arguing that nearly absolute confidentiality is more valuable to lawyers than clients).
49. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992).
50. Id. at 140–41.
51. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 6 (2007).
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are held out as core concerns of the profession. But despite the prominence
of talk about moral and social values in professional self-study reports, it is
difficult to come up with examples of concrete steps taken by leading
institutions within the legal profession, such as the ABA, state and local bar
associations, the judiciary, and the legal academy, which are directly aimed
at increasing the responsibility of lawyers for promoting justice, fairness,
and morality. Mandatory pro bono and clinical education are a start, but
providing legal services to low-income clients is only a part of what is
meant by social justice.52 More to the point, the bar’s most vigorous
defense of its independence generally occurs in cases where other
institutions seek to hold lawyers responsible for promoting injustice. The
controversy over the SEC’s proposed Sarbanes-Oxley regulations occurred
in the wake of financial accounting scandals, implicating the professional
advice and assistance of elite lawyers.53 The full extent of lawyer
participation in the misconduct underlying the 2007 global financial crisis
has yet to be revealed, but it is a safe bet that if there are calls for additional
regulation of the legal profession, the organized bar will be opposed.
Scholars who assert that a core value of the legal profession is the
promotion of justice and morality have in mind lawyers like Louis
Brandeis, who saw themselves almost as Platonic guardians of the public
interest. In a frequently recounted episode, Brandeis once told his client, a
large manufacturing firm, that its employees’ demands for higher wages
were justified.54 The conditions under which lawyers could effectively
serve as the conscience of their clients, particularly large corporations, are
generally believed to no longer exist. One reason, mentioned in many of
the articles in the Colloquium, is the increasing power of in-house legal
departments.55 Not only have in-house counsel exerted tremendous
pressure for cost containment, but they have assigned work to be performed
by outside counsel on a matter-by-matter basis, so that retained lawyers
now provide fairly narrow, technical assistance. It is hard to see how much
moral advising can occur in the context of discrete, transactional
relationships between outside lawyers and corporate clients. In-house
lawyers may have more opportunities to provide moral advice to clients, but
their dependence on one client, their employer, may make it even more
difficult to offer detached, independent counseling.56
Gillian Hadfield, commenting on the Brandeis story, highlights the
distinction between a robust conception of client counseling and the kind of
52. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 5, at 203–06; Russell G. Pearce, MacCrate’s Missed
Opportunity: The MacCrate Report’s Failure To Advance Professional Values, 23 PACE L.
REV. 575, 579–82 (2003).
53. Koniak, supra note 14, at 1239–42.
54. See, e.g., David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41
VAND. L. REV. 717, 722–23 (1988).
55. See, e.g., Dzienkowski, supra note 25. See generally THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE
VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 112–23 (2010); Ben W. Heineman, Jr., The Rise of the
General Counsel, HARV. BUS. REV. BLOG NETWORK (Sept. 27, 2012, 1:00 PM),
http://blogs.hbr.org/2012/09/the-rise-of-the-general-counsel/.
56. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1335 (2006).
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highly technical legal services requiring expertise in economics and finance
that now typify large law-firm practice:
This is not to say there is no role for lawyers to act as an ethical
breakwater when advising corporations about whether to facilitate
Chinese government censorship of Internet search results, to manipulate
their books to defraud investors and employee pension funds, or to resist
fair settlement of employment discrimination claims. But it is to say that
these normative considerations are of a fundamentally different character
from the economic considerations, which dominate the work of the
majority of lawyers today, of how to structure the delivery of Internet
services in a country that lacks both physical and market infrastructure,
how to design financial instruments that better diversify risk, or how to
structure a more competitive employee benefits package to improve
retention.57

Herein lies the dilemma: if the core value of the legal profession, which
justifies its monopoly over the provision of legal services, is concern for
justice and morality, and there is little market demand for services directed,
at least in part, at the realization of justice and morality, then the market and
professional core values will work at cross-purposes.
II.
This preliminary discussion provides some background for the themes
animating the articles presented at the Colloquium at Fordham Law School
on October 18, 2013. One common theme among many of the conference
presentations is that the profession may be losing its de facto monopoly
over the provision of legal services, even as the official proponents of the
professional nomos—i.e., courts and bar associations—continue to maintain
that they are the only institutions competent to regulate lawyers.
Professional regulators may be closing the corral gate long after the horses
have run away. As William Henderson argues, “[T]he legal profession is
becoming a subset of a larger legal industry that is increasingly populated
The American
by nonlawyers, technologists, and entrepreneurs.”58
profession is under further pressure due to the globalization of the market
for legal services.59 Now, large multinational business clients can select
lawyers in the United Kingdom, Australia, or elsewhere who are just as
capable as American lawyers at providing the services required by
transnational corporations, but who operate with fewer restrictions on
capital structures and can therefore practice more efficiently. Finally,
information technology enables the “unbundling” of legal services into
discrete tasks and creates the infrastructure necessary for the domestic and
global outsourcing of legal services, including the practice of so-called
virtual law firms comprised of lawyers in different U.S. states and around
57. Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of
Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1704 (2008).
58. William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461, 462 (2013).
59. See generally William D. Henderson, The Globalization of the Legal Profession, 14
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2007).
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the world. New York Times columnist Tom Friedman has written that
“anything that can be digitized can be outsourced to either the smartest or
the cheapest producer, or both.”60 The ability to digitize information has
allowed firms to decompose or “unbundle” legal services into component
parts, and find more efficient ways of handling some of the more routine
tasks that traditionally have been performed by lawyers.61 A litigated
matter or deal is composed of subtasks, some of which require highly
specialized training, skills, and judgment, but others of which are simply
commodity work. Coding documents for electronic discovery, for example,
is highly routine and standardized.62 If legal matters can be broken down
into subtasks, clients may begin to demand (as many clients already have)
that lawyers charge prices for routine tasks that are set in a competitive
market with many potential service providers.63
If nonlawyers are involved in the provision of what traditionally have
been considered legal services, there may be a risk that their involvement
will compromise some of the core values of the legal profession. This is an
argument often raised against third-party financing of legal services, the
topic of the first two articles discussed at the Colloquium, and one of the
subissues considered by the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20.64 Over
half of U.S. states have now relaxed common law prohibitions on
champerty and maintenance, allowing nonparties to provide financial
assistance to a litigant in exchange for a right to share in the proceeds of the
The Working Group on Alternative Litigation Finance
lawsuit.65
considered the ethical issues for lawyers that may arise in connection with
the representation of a client making use of alternative litigation financing,
concluded that the risks are manageable, and prepared a white paper
analyzing the legal issues.66 One of the issues left unresolved in the white
paper is the extent to which a third party may exercise control over
decisionmaking connected with an ongoing litigated matter. The High
Court of Australia, in Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v Fostif Pty Ltd.,
commonly known as Fostif, was willing to permit an outside investor to
60. MORGAN, supra note 55, at 90–91 (quoting THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS
FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 13–14 (2005)).
61. See Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous
Boundaries: The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137 (2010).
62. This is not to say that judgment is not involved in designing systems for managing
electronic document review. And, if professional judgment is involved, there may be
significant ethical issues in the use of new technologies to handle what were formerly tasks
firmly committed to the legal profession. See Dana Remus, The Uncertain Promise of
Predictive Coding, 99 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
63. See RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL
SERVICES 27–33, 100–05 (2010).
64. AM. BAR ASS’N, COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/ethics_2020/20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_informatio
nal_report.authcheckdam.pdf.
65. For an overview of the current state of champerty and maintenance law in the United
States, see Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61 (2011).
66. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 64. I served as co-reporter, with Professor Sebok, to the
working group.
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exercise considerable control over the conduct of litigation, including the
selection of counsel and the decision of whether to settle.67 A court in the
United States would be highly unlikely to go as far as Fostif, but it remains
uncertain how much control a litigation financier could exercise. As noted
above, U.S. law is quite comfortable with a significant degree of control in
the hands of liability insurers. Should third-party litigation funding
companies be permitted to exercise control to the same extent? Anthony
Sebok considers this question by focusing on the professional value
allegedly threatened by third-party control, i.e., independence.68 To say
lawyers are independent, of course, merely raises the question,
“independent from what?” and the answer has been, at different times and
given by different lawyers and scholars, independent from the state, from
courts, from the legislative and executive branches, from financial
considerations, and from the interests of clients. Professor Sebok usefully
approaches this question by asking what it is that lawyers provide to clients
that nonlawyers cannot (or do not) provide. Given the value of client
autonomy, the bar has the burden of articulating something that lawyers
provide to clients that clients may not, on their own volition, choose to give
up. In her article, also considering alternative litigation financing, Michele
DeStefano approaches the issue from an empirical angle, based on
interviews with general counsels at large American business corporations.69
She finds a significant demand by corporate clients for compliance advisors
who were often insulated from oversight by the general counsel’s office.
These officers may be practicing attorneys, but often are not. Professor
DeStefano analogizes claim funding to corporate compliance advising,
because both may involve the provision of legal advice by nonlawyers. If
both are demanded by sophisticated entity clients (often with in-house legal
counsel), one might reasonably conclude that the bar’s monopoly is
disserving at least one sector of clients.
As the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 was holding hearings and
deliberating, some observers wondered why alternative litigation financing
was within the Commission’s mandate, which was to consider the need for
changes to the Model Rules in light of globalization and information
technology.70 The answer is a certain amount of concern that “the British
[and to a lesser extent, the Aussies] are coming!” Taking a page from the
book of regulatory competition scholars,71 some American lawyers and

67. See Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v Fostif Pty Ltd. [2006] HCA 41 (Austl.).
68. Anthony J. Sebok, What Do We Talk About When We Talk About Control?, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 2939, 2940 (2014).
69. Michele DeStefano, Compliance and Claim Funding: Testing the Borders of
Lawyers’ Monopoly and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961,
2963 (2014).
70. See ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW (2012),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/
20120508_ethics_20_20_final_hod_introdution_and_overview_report.authcheckdam.pdf.
71. See, e.g., John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins & David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate
Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United
Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1699 (2002); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the
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academics believe that different regulatory regimes may offer a competitive
advantage to non-U.S. law firms. Tom Morgan, for example, warns: “If
American lawyers ignore the fact that their direct competitors play by
different rules, they will have only themselves to blame when clients take
advantage of these changes and seek the same or better professional
services at lower cost elsewhere.”72 Australian lawyers, for example, are
permitted to practice in publicly held law firms, perhaps giving them an
edge accessing capital, which they can use to their competitive advantage if
it enables them to provide the same services to clients at lower cost relative
to other large-firm competitors.73 If lawyers from other jurisdictions are
going to eat our competitive lunches because American lawyers are hobbled
by overly restrictive rules of professional conduct, perhaps the rules should
be modified to reduce this competitive disadvantage. In the background of
the regulatory-competition debate lies a prior issue that is sometimes underappreciated. That issue concerns the identity of the “direct competitors” to
which Morgan alludes. Within the domestic market, competitors to lawyers
are perceived to be accountants and consultants, investment bankers in the
corporate client sector, and such relatively local and small-scale service
providers as solo and small-firm accountants and real estate brokers in the
individual client sector.74 From a comparative perspective, it can be
surprisingly difficult to define the occupational group in other countries that
corresponds to the American legal profession. In Japan, for example, the
licensed-lawyer (bengoshi) profession is strikingly small, but there are
numerous allied occupational groups such as judicial scriveners, patent and
tax agents, and law-trained corporate employees, which provide the type of
legal services that would be the exclusive domain of American lawyers.75
Out-of-court legal advising in connection with litigation may be performed
by judicial scriveners in Japan, while giving advice to business corporations
on compliance with law is largely the province of law-trained quasi-lawyers

Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1435 (1992); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003);
Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate
Governance?, 21 OXFORD J. ECON. POL’Y 212 (2005).
72. MORGAN, supra note 55, at 90.
73. See Peter Lattman, Slater & Gordon: The World’s First Publicly Traded Law Firm,
WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2007, 9:19 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/05/22/slater-gordonthe-worlds-first-publicly-traded-law-firm/.
74. The differentiation of client groups into the corporate and individual client sectors or
“hemispheres” is from HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 44, at 127–36.
75. See, e.g., Kahei Rokumoto, The Present State of Japanese Practicing Attorneys: On
the Way to Full Professionalization?, in 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD
160 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988); see also Dan Fenno Henderson,
Abstract of Japanese Lawyers: Types and Roles in the Legal Profession, 3 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 411 (1969); Richard S. Miller, Apples vs. Persimmons—Let’s Stop Drawing
Inappropriate Comparisons Between the Legal Professions in Japan and the United States,
17 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 201 (1987).
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who have not passed the bar exam or graduated from the Legal Training
and Research Institute (LTRI).76
Laurel Terry’s contribution to this Colloquium accordingly considers the
scope of the legal profession’s monopoly in other countries.77 She
challenges the conventional wisdom that lawyers outside the United States
have a monopoly only over courtroom advocacy (as in the case of bengoshi
in Japan and barristers in England and Wales, with some qualifications),
with an open competitive field outside the courtroom. The story on the
ground is much more complicated than the conventional wisdom suggests,
and a great deal remains unknown. At the very least, one should be
skeptical of lawyer-equivalent titles and look functionally at which
occupational group is performing certain tasks, regardless of what title is
used.
Carole Silver considers the globalization of legal education in her
article.78 Lawyers are producers in the market for legal services, so law
schools must be understood as being part of a market for producers of
producers. If there is competition in the market for legal services, then
presumably educational institutions might compete to produce lawyers (or
nonlegal service providers) to meet the needs of clients. Law schools in the
United States compete to attract applicants from overseas, and as Silver
demonstrates, the American model of legal education has been remarkably
influential internationally. But the open question has been whether the
ABA would recognize legal education obtained outside the United States as
satisfying the education prerequisite for bar admission. Once again,
Australia is noteworthy for its entrepreneurial energy in the global market
for legal services, with the Australian Law Council seeking to qualify its
country’s graduates pursuing admission to practice in the United States. In
2012, however, the ABA’s Special Committee on Foreign Law School
Accreditation unanimously voted not to pursue further the possibility of
accrediting law schools located outside U.S. territory.79 In light of the
difficulties facing many U.S. law schools, including precipitously declining
enrollments and a tight job market for recent graduates,80 the ABA’s
reluctance to open up the American job market to competition from foreigntrained lawyers is perhaps understandable. Silver’s and Terry’s arguments,
taken together, is that antitrust and free trade norms in an increasingly
global marketplace will continue to exert pressures on producers (lawyers)
and producers of producers (law schools) regardless of the inaction of the
76. Rokumoto, supra note 75, at 164; Isaac Shapiro & Michael K. Young, The Role of
Law and Lawyers in Japan and the United States, 7 MICH. Y.B. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 25, 31
(1985).
77. Laurel S. Terry, Putting the Legal Profession’s Monopoly on the Practice of Law in
a Global Context, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2903, 2904 (2014).
78. Carole Silver, Globalization and the Monopoly of ABA-Approved Law Schools:
Missed Opportunities or Dodged Bullets?, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2869, 2869 (2014).
79. Id. at 2890–91. Schools affected by this decision included, in addition to the
Australian law schools, the relatively recently established Peking School of Transnational
Law, which offers a U.S.-style legal education in Shenzhen, China.
80. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).
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organized bar, which may find itself in the position of merely rearranging
deck chairs on the Titanic while the bar crashes into the iceberg of
globalization.
A similarly disruptive effect—this time, of technology—was the theme
of an article by Benjamin Barton and another coauthored by John McGinnis
and Russell Pearce.81 To put these articles in context, consider the claim
made by Richard Susskind, that the legal profession is undergoing a
transformation from providing a mostly “bespoke” product. That is, from
custom-crafted, one-off, highly labor-intensive services tailored to the needs
of a particular client with respect to a particular matter, toward an
increasingly standardized product that can be delivered more efficiently
using process, technology, and automation.82 The move toward the
delivery of more commoditized products is being driven by clients, who are
not willing to pay Saville Row prices when they can obtain a product offthe-rack that suits their needs (even if it is not custom tailored). Where
there is demand for a product or service, someone is likely to provide it, and
the last decade has seen significant growth among firms providing legal
support, electronic discovery and due diligence support, and legal process
outsourcing (LPO) services.83 Professor Barton’s article identifies a
dynamic that occurs in any market in which a disruptive technology is
introduced.84 As work that was previously performed on a custom basis is
challenged by mass-produced, cheaper, standardized substitutes, legacy
producers who cannot compete on price hunker down and defend their
model of bespoke production. At first, this is a successful strategy, as the
new entrants take only the segment of the market in which consumers are
highly price sensitive and not primarily concerned about quality. As
Professors McGinnis and Pearce note, some “superstar” producers of
customized products will even be able to command a premium for their
services.85 But look out! Eventually the low-cost producers figure out a
way to provide high-quality goods or services, and do so in the more
efficient manner they have pioneered. When this happens, the dinosaur
firms are unable to compete on price or quality, so they attempt to use
influence and lobbying to defend their turf.86 The emerging discipline of
legal analytics, enabled by significant advances in machine intelligence
(think of Watson, the Jeopardy-playing computer developed by IBM), has
enabled lawyers to do better than ever at conducting discovery, predicting

81. Benjamin H. Barton, The Lawyer’s Monopoly—What Goes and What Stays, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 3067 (2014); John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great
Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery
of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041 (2014).
82. See SUSSKIND, supra note 63, at 29–32.
83. See Henderson, supra note 58, at 482–87.
84. See Barton, supra note 81, at 3084 (discussing CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN, THE
INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: THE REVOLUTIONARY BOOK THAT WILL CHANGE THE WAY YOU DO
BUSINESS (2011)).
85. See McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 81, at 3054.
86. See id. at 3042 (“The surest way for lawyers to retain the market power of old is to
use bar regulation to delay and obstruct the use of machine intelligence.”).
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the results of litigation (and therefore facilitating settlement), and enabling
lawyers to improve document drafting by using a database of benchmark
contracts.87 These articles thus tell a regulatory-capture story familiar from
public-choice theory.88
Because the antonym of a captured regulatory agency is one that acts in
the public interest, seemingly marginal issues, such as the regulation of the
unauthorized practice of law, present important normative matters
concerning the nature of the public interest in the regulation of the legal
profession. The profession must appeal to public values in order to justify
its monopoly, but as Laurel Rigertas argues, it tends to focus too narrowly
on some values to the exclusion of others.89 There is no doubt that
regulation can be justified as a means of ensuring the quality of some
product or service; the Food and Drug Administration, for example,
legitimately prescribes standards for the labeling of pharmaceuticals,
because most consumers are not sufficiently knowledgeable about medicine
and the formulation of drugs to know of the associated risks. Similarly,
professional regulators can require that would-be lawyers graduate from
law school and pass the bar exam, because prospective clients have no other
way of knowing whether someone who holds herself out as a provider of
legal services is competent. But overbroad regulation may interfere with
consumer choice. Products liability law, for example, tries to avoid the
imposition of safety standards that mandate a particular risk-versus-utility
tradeoff if there are consumers for whom it would be rational to forego the
benefit of a safety feature.90 Every first-year torts student learns the Hand
formula, B < PL, indicating that there is a duty to take some safety
precaution only when doing so would cost less than the expected accident
costs if the precaution were not taken multiplied by the probability of the
accident occurring.91 Applying this analysis to the legal profession’s
monopoly, suppose there were some nonlawyer or software product that
could do a pretty good job preparing a divorce petition in a relatively

87. See id. at 3045–46.
88. See, e.g., Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public
Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990).
89. See Laurel A. Rigertas, The Legal Profession’s Monopoly: Failing To Protect
Consumers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2683, 2694 (2014).
90. See, e.g., Linegar v. Armour of Am., 909 F.2d 1150, 1154–55 (8th Cir. 1990)
(holding that body armor for police officers was not defective in design for failing to include
side protection, because the vest in question permitted greater mobility and was not as hot
for the wearer); Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 679, 683–84 (N.Y.
1999) (concluding that a school bus was not defective due to the lack of a backup alarm,
because a reasonable school district might conclude that the annoyance of the alarm was not
worth tolerating given other means of avoiding danger).
91. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). I take no
position here on the long-running debate over whether economic cost-benefit analysis
exhausts the reasonable-care inquiry, as Judge Richard Posner contends. See Richard A.
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 29–34 (1972) (discussing whether
negligence is economically inefficient behavior or whether the Hand formula is merely a
useful but incomplete heuristic, illustrating the impact of regulation on consumer choice).
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uncomplicated situation.92 Hypothetically, imagine that there was a 5
percent chance that a consumer who used the nonlawyer would suffer a
$10,000 loss caused by negligence, and that a consumer who instead
retained a fully licensed lawyer would have only a 1 percent likelihood of
experiencing a loss due to negligence. When would a risk-neutral consumer
opt for the lawyer? The answer is when the price differential between
services provided by a lawyer and nonlawyer is less than $400, which is the
savings in the expected cost of errors due to negligence. In terms of
reduction in error costs, it is worth it to spend $300 more on a lawyer, but
not to spend $500 more. Fully informed consumers ought to be able to
make this type of purchasing decision, and they could if professional
regulation were aimed at reducing information costs, rather than eliminating
competition from nonlawyers entirely.
Along these lines, another theme that emerged in the Colloquium is that
the claim by the profession to a legitimate monopoly over the provision of
legal services rests on empirically unsupported premises. Consider the
consumer protection rationale. A district court accepted the bar’s proffered
justification for enforcing UPL restrictions against LegalZoom—namely,
that if nonlawyers are permitted to provide legal services, “there is a clear
risk of the public being served in legal matters by ‘incompetent or
unreliable persons.’”93 Deborah Rhode has long argued that the profession
has, at best, only anecdotal evidence for this claim,94 and her recent
research shows that relatively few complaints come to state UPL regulators
from consumers who have been harmed by poor quality services.95 As
Leslie Levin shows in her contribution to this Colloquium, there is evidence
that clients represented by lawyers get better results in litigated disputes
than clients who are unrepresented, but what little evidence is available
suggests that lawyers do not do better than representatives with no legal
training.96 Citing a study by Herbert Kritzer, she observes that formal legal
training is less important than experience with both the subject matter and
the players involved in the process.97 Contrary to the “myth of
omnicompetence,”98 it may be the case that professional expertise is highly
differentiated. Merely being admitted to practice law does not guarantee

92. Consider the recently enacted rule in Washington State permitting the provision of
certain services by limited license legal technicians, discussed infra notes 108–10 and
accompanying text.
93. Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1064 (W.D. Mo. 2011)
(quoting Hulse v. Criger, 247 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Mo. 1952)).
94. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective:
Alternative
Approaches to Nonlawyer Practice, 1 J. INST. STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 197, 204–06 (1996).
95. Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Protecting the Profession or the Public?
Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2598 (2014).
96. Leslie C. Levin, The Monopoly Myth and Other Tales About the Superiority of
Lawyers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2619, 2621 (2014).
97. Id. at 2620.
98. HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 44, at 12.
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one’s competence at any particular task, let alone one’s comparative
advantage over nonlawyer professionals at performing that task.99
The next set of articles considers the professional monopoly and core
values debate in the context of the failure of the ABA Commission on
Ethics 20/20 to submit even a very limited alternative business structures
(ABS) reform to the House of Delegates. The Commission may be faulted
for not seeking to innovate in the area of law-practice structures, but it may
also be forgiven for not wanting to relive the experience of the acrimonious
debate over multidisciplinary practices (MDPs) from over a decade ago.100
As John Dzienkowski’s article shows, however, regardless of what
regulators do, some innovation is bound to be the product of pressure from
corporate clients to reduce the costs of legal services.101 He discusses six
different companies that have been formed to offer corporate consumers of
legal services alternatives to large law firms. Some, like Clearspire and
VLP Law Group, are merely law firms reengineered for greater efficiency,
for example, by eschewing fancy downtown office space for remote
locations or lawyers who work at home. Others, such as Paragon and
AxiomLaw, provide, among other things, solutions to short-term staffing
crunches by making lawyers available on a project-by-project basis. It is
not yet clear how “disruptive” these new models of law firm organization
will be, as they represent mostly marginal tinkering with existing models.
Yet, they appear not to have attracted the kind of concerted opposition that
doomed the ABS and MDP proposals. Moreover, one gets the impression
that corporate clients will be able to use their economic clout and the
expertise of in-house counsel’s offices to get whatever they want from their
outside providers of legal services. As Dzienkowski notes, despite the
ABA’s resistance to allowing even limited experiments with alternative
practice structures, “corporate clients have increasingly relied upon the
99. The Gillers casebook includes an excerpt from Professional Adjusters, Inc. v.
Tandon, 433 N.E.2d 779 (Ind. 1982), which involved an attempt by the Indiana legislature to
create a licensed paraprofession called certified public adjusters to assist the insured in
dealing with their insurance companies (who were represented by their own adjusters, who
were nonlawyer employees). Gillers rightly says in a note following the case: “I’d wager
that trained (and licensed) insurance adjusters are as good as, if not better than, most lawyers
at interpreting property insurance contracts.” GILLERS, supra note 33, at 643. It is an
empirical question, but it does seem intuitively plausible that familiarity with insurance
contracts and the practices of various insurers is a far more important determinant of
competence than possessing a license to practice law. Consider by analogy the relationship
between frequency of performing a procedure and error rates in surgery. See Atul Gawande,
No Mistake, NEW YORKER, Mar. 30, 1998, at 77 (reporting that, in contrast with a baseline
failure rate of 10 to 15 percent in hernia repair operations, a small medical center in Canada
achieves a 1 percent failure rate at half the cost, because all the surgeons in the medical
center do nothing but hernia operations).
100. For thoughtful analyses of the debate, see Nathan M. Crystal, Core Values: False
and True, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 747 (2001); Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions
on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications
for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1155–57 (2000); James W. Jones &
Bayless Manning, Getting at the Root of Core Values: A “Radical” Proposal To Extend the
Model Rules to Changing Forms of Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1159, 1159–60 n.2
(2000).
101. Dzienkowski, supra note 25, at 2999.
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nonlawyer-controlled delivery of certain types of legal services.”102
Middle-income consumers have no equivalent leverage in the market.
Deborah Rhode and Lucy Ricca accordingly consider the situation of
relatively unsophisticated consumers of legal services in the individualclient hemisphere.103 They recommend a regulatory approach that aims
In the
directly at consumer protection and quality assurance.104
immigration area, for example, consumers are often victimized by
nonlawyers who call themselves notaries, seeking to capitalize on consumer
confusion with the prestige of the legitimate civil law profession of
notario.105 This type of fraud could be controlled to some extent by
expanding licensing for qualified nonlawyer immigration advocates, as is
presently done in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.106 Jessica
Dixon Weaver, however, questions the conventional wisdom that
nonlawyer-provided legal assistance, including filing forms in matrimonial
cases, will improve access to justice without harming pro se litigants.107
The penultimate panel continued this theme of the effects of
fragmentation of the legal profession and, consequently, the
decentralization of regulation. Jack Sahl’s article comes at the issue from
two different directions.108 First, he looks at a limited move toward what
has been called a “driver’s license” model of state regulation, in which a
new applicant will be admitted to practice in a particular state, but then will
be permitted to practice in any other state, just as my New York driver’s
license entitles me to drive in Texas. The Commission on Ethics 20/20
considered and rejected a proposal modeled on Colorado’s rule permitting
lawyers admitted in other states to practice in Colorado as long as they do
not establish an office in the state.109 Sahl describes a resolution by the
Conference of Chief Justices aimed at making it easier for the spouses of
military service members to become admitted to practice without taking the
bar exam. He advocates for extending similar rights to other moving
lawyers, and, wisely given the failure of the driver’s license proposal in the
Commission on Ethics 20/20, advocates state-by-state action on this reform.
The subject of the second half of Sahl’s article is more radical, and was the
subject of a great deal of discussion at the Colloquium: the rule recently
adopted by the Washington Supreme Court permitting practice by limited

102. Id. at 2998–99.
103. Rhode & Ricca, supra note 95.
104. Id.
105. See Alan Obye, ABA Conducts First ‘School’ on Policing Unauthorized Practice of
Law, 29 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 632 (2013).
106. Rhode & Ricca, supra note 95, at 2608–09.
107. Jessica Dixon Weaver, Overstepping Ethical Boundaries? Limitations on State
Efforts To Provide Access to Justice in Family Courts, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2705, 2743–44
(2014).
108. Jack P. Sahl, Cracks in the Profession’s Monopoly Armor, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
2635, 2637–38 (2014).
109. See James Geoffrey Durham, Is the ABA Ready for the Driver’s License Rule?
Ethics 20/20 Commission Flirts with an Expanded Multijurisdictional Practice Rule, PROB.
& PROP., Nov./Dec. 2011, at 54–55.
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license legal technicians (LLLTs).110 Unlike familiar allied professionals
like paralegals and nurse practitioners, LLLTs can operate without being
under the supervision of a lawyer admitted to practice in Washington State.
Many LLLTs are expected to practice in the domestic relations area, in
which there are significant unmet needs for legal services.111 The
Washington experiment bears watching to see whether LLLTs can deliver
competent legal services at a lower cost than lawyers—that is, whether it is
Weaver or Rhode and Ricca whose hypothesis is supported by the empirical
evidence.
One theme of regulatory reform has been a critique of the assumption by
the ABA and state courts that there should be a one-size-fits-all approach to
regulation. For example, conflict-of-interest rules do not differentiate
between large and small law firms, even though relatively rigid rules may
impose significantly higher costs on large firms, particularly those with
multinational operations.112 Proposals for reform often treat the two
hemispheres of legal practice in isolation from each other, seeking (broadly
speaking) further access to justice in the individual-client hemisphere and
client autonomy in the corporate-client hemisphere. Dana Remus’s article
questions the conventional wisdom that professional regulation ought to
vary by context and, in particular, whether fragmented approaches to
regulation may exacerbate problems caused by the interaction between
lawyers in the different hemispheres of practice.113 Her article seeks to
hold onto something in the concept of “lawyer” that transcends the
particular areas in which lawyers might practice. In other words, what are
the core values that constitute the legal profession, or what normatively
speaking separates lawyers from nonlawyer providers of legal services?
The answer sounds like a tautology, but in fact has content: the legal
profession is committed to the values underlying the legal system, which
may not reduce to the values of nonclients, such as efficiency and
autonomy. Lawyers must provide competent services, even if clients may
desire to spend less on them, and they must remain independent from the
ends of clients, even if clients would prefer to have more control over their
legal service providers. Professor Remus’s article accordingly cautions
regulatory reformers not to lose sight of what makes lawyers distinctive in a
market they share with accountants, consultants, information-technology
specialists, and even machines.114
Finally, the last two articles consider law as information, and ask what
rights citizens have to receive it. Bridgette Dunlap criticizes the efforts of
the United States to promote the rule of law in developing countries for

110. See In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License
Legal Technicians, No. 25700-A-1005, slip op. at 1 (Wash. June 15, 2012).
111. Sahl, supra note 108.
112. See Bruce A. Green, Ethics Reform from “MDP” to “20/20”: Some Cautionary
Reflections, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 1, 7 (2010).
113. See Dana Remus, Hemispheres Apart, a Profession Connected, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
2665, 2674–79 (2014).
114. See id.
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being excessively lawyer centric.115 Suppose the United States succeeds in
also exporting its unified legal profession and zealous enforcement of
UPL—the result will not be to the benefit of disempowered citizens. “The
model that the United States seeks to export has proven, at home and
abroad, to concentrate power in the hands of those with the money and
power to access judicial systems.”116 The rule of law is not the same thing
as democracy, let alone a well-functioning democracy characterized by
accountability, transparency, and lack of corruption. Picking up again on
the theme of access versus quality, Dunlap makes the important point that
full participation in society requires a threshold level of legal knowledge,
but the organized bar’s focus on providing quality services has led to the
perception that law is the exclusive domain of lawyers.117 In the domestic
context, Renee Newman Knake argues that many regulations impede the
flow of legal information. These regulations may be constitutionally
questionable, particularly after the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a
Vermont statute that prohibited the sale of drug-prescribing information by
doctors118 and the Virginia Supreme Court vacated professional discipline
against a lawyer who had blogged about his cases, revealing client
information in the process.119 If legal information receives the same level
of protection as political or artistic speech, a number of settled doctrines
may have to be reconsidered under the First Amendment.120 There is
already a substantial body of constitutional case law on attorney advertising
and solicitation, to which a recent Second Circuit case is a valuable
addition,121 but what other areas of lawyer regulation might be affected?
Knake proposes a distinction between regulations that wholly foreclose a
particular avenue of distribution and those that are aimed at competence,
confidentiality, or other ends short of prohibition on communications.122
Interestingly, she regards the fee-splitting rule, supporting bans on
nonlawyer ownership interests in law firms, as potentially vulnerable to a
constitutional challenge.123 It is true that the core concern of the rule, at
least traditionally, was with communication—namely, the impermissible
solicitation of clients using “runners” or “cappers.”124 Not only has the
115. Bridgette Dunlap, Anyone Can “Think Like a Lawyer”: How the Lawyers’
Monopoly on Legal Understanding Undermines Democracy and the Rule of Law in the
United States, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2817, 2817–18 (2014).
116. Id. at 2821.
117. Id. at 2820.
118. Sorrell v. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. 2667 (2011).
119. See Hunter v. Va. State Bar, 744 S.E.2d 611 (Va. 2013); Renee Newman Knake,
Legal Information, the Consumer Law Market, and the First Amendment, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2843, 2856–57 (2014).
120. Knake, supra note 119, at 2854 (discussing John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future
Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49 (1996)).
121. Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 88–100 (2d Cir. 2010) (invalidating many
provisions of the amended New York advertising rules under the commercial speech test
articulated in Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
122. Knake, supra note 119, at 2855.
123. See id. at 2859–65; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2013).
124. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS §§ 9.2.4, 16.5 (1986); see also
Brown v. Grimes, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893, 909 (Ct. App. 2011); McIntosh v. Mills, 17 Cal.
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Court held that solicitation may be fairly aggressively regulated by
states,125 but it is a stretch to read the First Amendment as reaching the
capital structure of law firms. Perhaps this kind of outside-the-box thinking
is what is needed to shake up the profession’s complacency about its
monopoly over legal services.

Rptr. 3d 66, 73–75 (Ct. App. 2004); Danzig v. Danzig, 904 P.2d 312, 314 (Wash. Ct. App.
1995). The rule seems to be litigated most frequently today in the context of referral
arrangements. See, e.g., Son v. Margolius, 709 A.2d 112 (Md. 1998); In re Lock,
Commission No. 2010PR00164 (Hearing Bd. of the Ill. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary
Comm. July 17, 2012), aff’d, Commission No. 2010PR00164 (Review Bd. of the Ill.
Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm. Aug. 1, 2013).
125. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 618 (1995).

